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Abstract 
The author derives a new concept of the model of the subject discounting of utility function or consumption on a theoretical basis. 
He surveys the formation and evolution of models for calculating the subjective discount factor (β). This paper focuses on the 
exponential and hyperbolic discounting utility model, which is among the current mainstream for its simplicity. The author builds 
on these models, as well as alternative models generated by the critics of the two oldest models of discounting. The aim of this 
paper is to find a model that extends the generalized hyperbolic model parameters representing the effect of uncertainties of the 
environment in the intertemporal decision-making. The original generalised hyperbolic model was extended with the subjective 
probability of the negative environment with its negative effect on current consumption and the positive effect on future 
consumption of the agents or vice versa. The paper presents a link between the neoclassical and hedonic approach. The parameters 
introduced in the model are mainly of psychological nature (risk aversion, loss aversion, etc.). Using the final parametric model, 
we may, for instance, explain why the subjective discount factor (β) is increasing, i.e. leading to delaying (desired) consumption, 
although the subjective discount rate (ρ) (patience of consumption) is positive and also increasing. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of intertemporal decision-making agents is associated with comparing the present and future value of the 
utility function or consumption by means of the subjective discount factor (β). After the economic recession and 
depression, which hit us in 2008 – 2009, the world experienced some changes of the behaviour of agents, which were 
reflected in their consumption and savings. 
I believe that this evolution, which culminated across Europe in the first half of 2013, was caused not only by 
waiting for better (lower) prices, as is often presented by the Governor of the CNB (Singer, 2014), but also for fear of 
uncertain future. This opinion is also based on the course of the real consumption all around Europe. According to the 
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OECD data, the annual growth rate of household consumption in Europe was negative from Q4 2011 to Q1 2013; in 
the European Monetary Union, even until Q3 2013. In the Czech Republic, the annual real consumption, on the other 
hand, started to increase at the end of June 2013 and during the third quarter, according to data from the OECD, with 
the annual growth of 0.6%. The recovery of consumption occurred a few months before the intervention of the CNB. 
Therefore, I believe that the recovery was due to other factors: the perception of uncertainty of the environment, or 
changes in the economy, politics and other areas affecting households. 
For example, if we compare the dynamics of the consumer confidence indicator, the fastest growth in consumer 
confidence was in the middle of 2013 (07 months - 10/2013, the average growth rate of 1.4 percentage points), slowing 
down after the intervention (in months 11/2013 - 02 / 2014 amounted to only 1.2 percentage points). 
The aim of this paper is therefore to extend the existing models for discounting consumption with parameters 
reflecting the "mood" of agents that are reflected in consumption probably more than has been assumed in the current 
macroeconomic models. The "mood" of agents, or mood in society, will be expressed by means of the subjective 
probability of occurrence of negative phenomena, which have a decisive impact on the financial situation of agents.  
2. Evolution models of the discounting utility function 
In the last century, many economists have dealt with some form of a mathematical model or function of subjective 
discounting of the value (in general, the relationship between the current and future value). For instance, these include 
P. Samuelson, G. Ainsliho, J. Mazur, G. Loewenstein, D. Prelec and many others who have dealt with issues in their 
contributions to the mathematical model for calculating the discounting of consumption with the subjective discount 
rate (ρ), time preference: τ = (1+ρ), discount factor: β = 1/τ = 1/(1+ ρ) and other parameters. 
For many years now, psychologists and economists have shown that discounting is not an exponential but 
hyperbolic form and the subjective discount rate (ρ) certainly not constant over time, as assumed in some models of 
discounting. 
The theories regarding discounting, even partially, were enriched with the first mathematical model in 1928, when 
F. P. Ramsey published the well-known paper "A Mathematical Theory of Saving". Among other things, Ramsey 
explains the relationship between the marginal product of capital and the subjective discount rate (ρ) and also the real 
interest rate (r). 
Ramsey (1928, pp. 553) assumes that the subjective discount rate (ρ) is constant, but it has been now accepted that 
it is not constant. He also assumes that all agents are the same (Ramsey, 1928, pp. 556). He describes the relationship 
between the real interest rate (r) and subjective discount rate (ρ) as follows: If r > ρ, then: “he will save when he is 
young, not only to provide for loss of earning power in old age, but also because he can get more pounds to spend at 
a later date for those he forgoes spending now.” Otherwise if ρ > r,  “it may be negative, as they may borrow when 
young and pay back when old.” (Ramsey, 1928, pp. 558). In particular, Ramsey’s paper deals with the theory of 
savings and interest rate; however, it derives the supply and demand for savings, as well as in connection with the 
discounting utility function. 
I. Fisher (1930) was the first author who tried to use a graphical system to describe the inter-temporal analysis. He 
introduced the graphical representation of the intertemporal (but only two-dimensional) model) in Chapter X by using 
indifference curves that we use in this form for graphic representation today. 
2.1. Exponential discounting model 
Fischer's graphic indifference curves were followed a few years later by P. Samuelson (1937). He introduced, in 
his seven-pages’ article "A Note on Measurement of Utility", the mathematical model for discounting of utility not 
only in the two periods, as allowed by Fisher’s two-dimensional graphical model, but also for more periods of time (t 
→ T). 
A mathematical model of the subjective discount factor (β) of P. Samuelson (1937) was exponential, and as already 
mentioned above, this model is used to the present, although after simplification (limited to two periods), it may be 
regarded as a model for hyperbolic. The general utility function with the exponential model of the subjective discount 
factor according to Samuelson looked as follows: 
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 ܸሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܷሺݔሻǤ ݁ି௧Ǥ୪୬ሺଵାఘሻ (1) 
In the adjusted form (Koopmans, Diamond, Williamson, 1964): 
 ܷሺݔሻ ൌ σ ߚ௧ିଵݑሺݔ௧ሻ∞௧ୀଵ  (2) 
Where: ࢋିሺ࢚ି૚ሻ ܔܖሺ૚ା࣋ሻ = ቀ ଵሺଵାఘሻቁ
௧ିଵ
ൌ ࢼ࢚ି૚  
After adjustment, we can write: 
  ܸሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ σ ܷሺݔ௧ሻǤ
ଵ
ሺଵାఘሻ೟షభ
்
௧ୀଵ  (3) 
Where ρ is the subjective discount rate. 
The subjective discount factor (β) characterizes the impatience of each agent in relation to consumption over time 
and takes the values (0, 1>, and only if the subjective discount rate (ρ) is positive <0, ∞). The negative values of ρ can 
be achieved only in cases where agents prefer future consumption to the present. The subjective discount rate (ρ), or 
the subjective discount factor (β) have some practical use and may not necessarily be a subjective discounting utility 
function, or consumption.  
Samuelson's model assumes that the subjective discount rate (ρ) is constant over time, which experiments did not 
show a few years later. This assumption is therefore one of the many criticized problems of the exponential model. 
The exponential model is based on other assumptions, among which are: (reposted from Streich, Levy, 2007, pp. 
201- 202): 
x Positive time preference - People prefer to receive goods sooner rather than later. Thus, the discount factor is 
less than one (subject discount factor (β) is lower than 1, β<1). 
x Constant-rate discounting - also referred to as time consistency or time invariance. The ratio of the discount 
functions of any period and the preceding period is simply the discount factor, βt+1/ βt = β. Any preference 
relation between separately occurring outcomes is unaffected if all outcomes are delayed or accelerated by an 
equal length of time. If an individual prefers one apple today to two apples tomorrow, then she will prefer one 
apple in one year to two apples in a year and a day. 
x Independence of utility - utility in each period is independent of utility in every other period. Utilities are 
separable, so that the intertemporal utility function, U(x), can be calculated from the sum of every future period's 
discounted utility. 
x Independence of consumption - preference orderings over consumption or outcomes are not affected by the 
outcome of any one period. Having an ice cream two days in a row should not affect my preference for ice cream 
over other desserts the next day. 
x Stationary instantaneous utility - the utility function is constant over time. Individuals do not change their 
preferences as they move through the sequence of choices. 
x Independence of discounting - this assumes that the discount function does not vary over types of consumption. 
Thus, discounting is the same for money as it is for apples or for anything else. 
In addition to these assumptions, the exponential discount model has "anomalies" that are analyzed by Loewenstein, 
Prelec (1992), Frederic et al. (2002) and also Streich, Levy (2007). The anomalies are related to the dynamic 
inconsistency of time preference. There are several papers that describe dynamically inconsistent time preferences, for 
instance Thaler (1981) or Herrnstein (1990). In addition, the exponential model cannot explain why the "gains" are 
discounted by a higher subjective discount rate than "losses" and why smaller amounts discounted over large amounts 
(see Thaler, 1981; Ainslie a Haendel, 1983, Kirby a Marakovic, 1995 and other empirical studies). 
Because of these and other imperfections of the exponential discounting of utility, new models and approaches 
were created.  
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2.2. Hyperbolic discount model 
J.R. Doyle (2013) compiled the list of discounting models, viewing them from a general perspective, i.e. P = present 
value, F = future value, and then he associated these values using a functional approach of a number of authors across 
the whole 20th century, including currently developed models.  
Doyle (2013) describes altogether 27 models of discounting, of which I would like to mention here in detail only 
the following (besides the mentioned of the exponential model): 
x Hyperbolic discount model (Ainslie, 1975; Herrnstein, 1981) 
x Generalized hyperbolic model (Loewenstein, Prelec, 1992) 
Ainslie (1975) derives the discounting model: 
 ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ଵ௔Ǥ௧
∞
௧ୀ଴ , (4) 
With a "reciprocal" equation (Mazur, 1987, pp. 58), where “a” is parameter, which represents individual differences 
between subjects or procedural differences between experiments - it is a constant of the adequacy (Doyle, 2013, pp. 
123).  
This model has a gap particularly in the case when t = 0, then β = +∞, which makes the current value also equal to 
+∞. This problem was solved by adding +1 in the denominator (Herrnstein, 1981), which produced a further model 
that Mazur (1987, pp. 58), or Frederick et al. (2002, pp. 360), or Doyle (2013, pp.123) formulated in the form: 
 ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ଵଵାఘǤ௧
∞
௧ୀ଴  (5) 
Mazur (1987) calls this model hyperbolic and at the same time, however, he recognizes that technically, the previous 
reciprocal model is also a hyperbolic one (see equation 4). 
Some authors (for instance Commons, 1981; Commons, Woodford and Ducheny, 1982; Davison 1969; Green and 
Snyderman, 1980 etc.) consider as important to extend the function by the exponent "B":  
 ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ଵሺଵାఘǤ௧ሻಳ
∞
௧ୀ଴  (6) 
Mazur (1987, pp. 58-59) calls this model the "hyperbolic model with exponent" and regards it as the general form 
of the hyperbolic model.  
This model was later followed by an important paper written by Prelec and Loewenstein (1992). The authors of 
their general form of the hyperbolic model added a variable α: 
 ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ଵሺଵାఈ௧ሻംȀഀ
∞
௧ୀ଴  (7) 
Where γ = ln(1+ρ) (see Samuelson 1937, pp. 156, equation 3.I) and the α-coefficient determines how  much the 
function departs from constant discounting; the limiting case, as a goes to zero, is the exponential discount fiction 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, pp. 580). The models (6) and (7) are very similar to the exponential discounting model. 
The difference between them consists in the variable “t” (time) If: 
ఈ՜଴
ଵ
ሺଵାఈ௧ሻംȀഀ , function is going to the 
exponential model: ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ݁ିఊǤ௧∞௧ୀ଴ . 
The equation (7) adjusted for textbook application of intertemporal decision-making (limited to only two periods), 
may under certain circumstances (α → 0, t1 = 0, t2 = 1) take the exponential form, as the model in two periods and α 
→ 0 has this form: 
 ߚሺݐ଴ሻ ൌ  ቀ
ଵ
ଵାఘቁ
଴
ൌ ͳ  (8) 
 ߚሺݐଵሻ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
ଵାఘቁ
ଵ
ൌ  ଵଵାఘ  (9) 
 
Hyperbolic models are also criticized, for example by Read (2001), who at the end of the cited work states: 
Moreover, if we go beyond the context of the present studies, hyperbolic discounting fails to predict any further 
interesting phenomena in intertemporal choice. It cannot accommodate sign effects (Thaler, 1981: discounting is more 
rapid for gains than for losses), magnitude effects (Kirby, 1997: discounting is more rapid for small amounts than for 
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large amounts), reference point effects (Loewenstein, 1988: discounting is greater when a positive experience is 
delayed than when it is brought forward), intransitive intertemporal choice (Roelofsma & Read, 2000), a variety of 
sequence effects (Chapman, 1996; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), or any other major result. The weight of evidence 
against hyperbolic discounting appears strong, and I suggest that researchers should reconsider their allegiance to it 
as a model of human time preference. 
It may be summarized that the exponential and hyperbolic discounting models of utility functions or consumption 
by equations (8) and (9), despite much criticism, belong to the mainstream economics of discounting utility functions, 
especially in two-dimensional applications. 
In addition to these models, therefore, were created alternative functions for calculating the subjective discount rate 
(β) to reflect the deficiencies of the exponential or hyperbolic discounting utility function. 
2.3. Alternative discount models 
In recent years, there have been a number of other models which vary in different parameters. Very frequently, they 
are only some modifications of hyperbolic or exponential discounting, for instance papers by Rachlin (2006), 
Roelofsma (1996), or Ebert and Prelec (2007). We will consider them as an alternative, since they do not (yet) belong 
to mainstream of economics. 
Models of Myerson a Green (1995) and also Rodriguez and Logue (1988), Rachlin (2006) are based on the model 
of hyperbolic discounting, which presented by Mazur (1987), respectively based on Loewenstein, Prelec (1992). The 
basic hyperbolic model was extended with the exponent, yet always slightly differently. The Discounting functions 
based on Myerson and Green (1995) have the following form: 
 ߚ ൌ  ଵሺଵାሺଵȀ௠ሻఘሻೞ (10) 
Where m is the minimum time from options to consumption (rather than time from rewards to other options). The 
parameter s reflects individual differences in the measured quantities and probabilities (it may be expected to remain 
constant for all options), see Myerson and Green (1995, pp. 274-275). Doyle (2013) presents this model slightly 
differently:  
 ߚ ൌ  ଵሺଵା௛೘ఘሻభȀ೘ (11) 
Where 1/m = s (marking according to Myerson and Green). The original authors used the parameter 1/m as a 
variable in the main part of a hyperbola, as shown in the equation (10) and not as an exponent, as modified by Doyle 
equation (see Equation 11). 
A similar model to the one of Myerson and Green was created by Rodriguez and Logue (1988), who also inserted 
exponent "s" into the model. But this time, there is perception sensitivity to physical stimuli. The discount model then 
looks as follows: 
 ߚ ൌ ଵሺଵା௞ఘೞሻ (12) 
Where „ρ“ is a physical variable of discounting and "k" is a constant. Rachlin (2006) admits that the more general 
model for of discounting is the equation by Myerson and Green (1995), which is consistent with Stevens's 
psychological law (Stevens, 1957), which says that “a psychologically effective variable (a “sensation” in 
psychophysics) is a power function of its physical cause.” (Rachlin, 2006). 
Other important models also include the model of the formation of habits. "James Duesenberry (1952) was the first 
economist to propose the idea of "habit formation" – that the utility from current consumption ("tastes") can be affected 
by the level of past consumption. This idea was more formally developed by Pollak (1970) and Harl Ryder and Geoffrey 
Heal (1973)." (Frederick et al., 2002, pp. 369). Frederick et al. also states: “The key feature of habit formation that 
drives many of these results is that, after a shock, consumption adjustment is sluggish in the short term but not in the 
long." 
A similar model is called "Reference-Point Model" or reference-dependent utility models, based on "prospect 
theory" (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Kahneman and Tversky paper is crucial to the development of the economic 
theory, since their approach is critical to the theory of expected utility, which in psychological experiments does not 
correspond to reality. The decision-making under uncertainty examines not only risk aversion, but also loss aversion, 
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which determines the behaviour of agents, especially in intertemporal decision-making. For instance, if there is a 
growing risk of lower income of the agent in the future (when they lose their job), then the agent with loss aversion 
does not reduce their current consumption, but they would reduce the future consumption if there were a decline in 
their income.  
The Reference-Point Model in intertemporal decision-making can explain why we discount "Losses" less than 
"Gains": “Shifting consumption in any direction is made less desirable by loss aversion, since one loses consumption 
in one period and gains it in another.” (Frederick et al. 2002, pp. 370). Furthermore, it can explain the asymmetry 
between the delay and speedup (Loewenstein, 1988), as time discounting of delaying consumption is higher due to 
loss aversion, or in fact loss aversion creates a strong resistance to delay consumption. 
This model I also mentioned by Rachlin (2006), who presents his form as follows: 
 ݑ ൌ  ଵଵା௞జೞ  (13) 
Where υ = odds against winning, or also: ߭ ൌ ଵିగగ , „u“ represents the weights for the decision. If “k” and “s” 
increase, then “u” decreases in relation to “π” and if k = s = 1, then u = π. The parameters “k” and “s” then increase 
or decrease the value weights for decision-making based on risk-aversion.  
There are significantly more alternative discount models. In this paper, the other models can be ignored. In most 
cases, they are simple or more complicated modifications of exponential or hyperbolic models, which are often 
extended with the parameters of a psychological nature. In particular, Doyle (2013) and Frederick et al. (2002) present 
a more detailed overview of the models. 
2.4. The hedonic approach to discounting 
The issue of hedonic prices or utility function may seem unrelated to the intertemporal issues, especially when 
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) states that the overall benefit is time-neutral. Kahneman's note about time-neutrality 
refers to the total utility measured ex post. This is not about decision-making moment of the agent, but ex post 
evaluation of the utility, which is not affected by the temporal distance between the outcome and the retrospective 
evaluation. 
He states that: “Unlike decision making, in which the temporal distance between the moment of decision and the 
outcome may matter.” (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, Chapter 37). 
The objective of this work is the intertemporal decision making, which is close to the neoclassical economics, but 
it has ambitions to associate it also with the hedonistic approach and psychological methods. It can also be noted that 
subjective discounting already belongs to the scope of psychologists, as it represents individual subjective assessment 
of current consumption to the future. In the same manner, we could also include the issue of uncertainty and 
measurement and risk-aversion, or loss-aversion, which also subjectively characterize each agent. 
Examples of the hedonic approach may be found in hedonic prices, which are formed by the base price + increases 
or reductions related in particular to the environment but also to the characteristics of the agent. For example, the price 
of real property is derived mainly from the environment in which it is situated. 
The default assumptions for the next model will be the following. Provided there is a vector status of the 
environment ݖԦ:  
 ݖԦ ൌ ሺݖଵǡ ݖଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݖ௜ǡ ǥ Ǥ ݖ௡ሻ, 
Characteristics of the agent ሬ݄Ԧ:  
 ሬ݄Ԧ ൌ ሺ݄ଵǡ ݄ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݄௜ǡ ǥ Ǥ ݄௠ሻ, 
And goods ݔԦ: 
 ݔԦ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௜ǡ ǥ Ǥ ݔேሻ, 
Then the symbolic form of the total agent utility functions will be as follows:  
 ܷሺݖǡ ݄ǡ ݔሻ ൌ σ ݖపሬሬԦǡ ݄పሬሬሬሬԦݑሺݔ௜ሻே௜ୀଵ  (14) 
In other words, I will assume that the utility function of each i-th good "u(xi)" refers to the basic utility function of 
consumption of goods xi. This utility function of each agent is the same, but the resulting utility of the consumption of 
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goods xi for each agent will vary due to the influence of the environment status (ݖԦሻand the characteristics of the agent 
( ሬ݄Ԧ) and therefore the utility is individualized. 
In general, we can express the utility function as follows: 
 ܷሺݖǡ ݄ǡ ݔሻ ൌ σ ߚ൫ݖ௧ሬሬሬԦǡ ݄௧ሬሬሬሬԦ൯ݑሺݔ௧ሻ∞௧ୀ଴  (15) 
Where xt represents the goods consumed by agents, ݖԦ is a vector of the environment status and ݄ሬሬሬԦ is a vector of 
the characteristics of agents. 
3. Designing a new model of discounting consumption 
The previous development of discount models of utility functions or consumption demonstrates the efforts of 
economists and psychologists to interconnect economics and psychology. I consider these trends to be correct, as they 
correspond to the development of economic knowledge relations, especially to the strengthening of behavioural 
economy, where a large number of the current contributions and papers may be ranked. 
The aim of behavioural models is to offer a more precise expression of real phenomena in the economy, but this 
more precise expression using various psychological parameters of these models cannot always be generalized. 
My aim is to build on the existing studies and compile a discounting model incorporating psychological elements, 
but to the extent that the model may still be regarded as sufficiently general. From the perspective of psychology, I 
will try to exclude the psychological elements that are in intertemporal decision-making significance in second level 
in the decision-making. 
I completely leave out some psychological factors. For example, I will not take account of the stress during decision-
making, as its influence on the final decision has not been confirmed (see Haushofer et al., 2013). 
3.1. Basic assumptions 
Basic assumptions for the discounting model are based on the following points, which are based on the assumptions 
specified in Chapter 2.1.  
Positive or negative time preferences? 
I assume that the time preference in the context of patience in consumption will be positive, since the household 
consumption basket will contain only goods desired by the household. In other words, I exclude from the analysis the 
type of goods such as an "examination at the dentist’s", which certainly belongs to the group of goods for which we 
have no desire, and therefore we try to delay their consumption as much as possible (they belong among goods with 
negative time preferences). Although we find more similar goods, their share in the total consumption, I believe, is 
rather low, which allows me to eliminate them. 
Constant or variable value of subjective discount rate (ρ) 
Within this paper, it is assumed that the discounting model respects the criticism (Thaler, 1981; Strotz, 1955-1956; 
Herrnstein, 1990, etc.) of the first discounting model, i.e. in particular, the criticism of the exponential model. 
The subjective discount rate (ρ) will be considered dynamic over time for the purposes of this paper. The agent will 
assess one apple today against two tomorrow differently than an apple for a year or two apples per year and one day.  
Time independence of utility 
I suppose that is the benefit in each period independent of utility in future periods, which leads to the fact that the 
utility function is separable and total utility can be calculated as the sum of the discounted utility of each period. 
Independence of consumption 
I will also assume that the consumption of one good cannot affect consumption today of a similar good tomorrow. 
In many cases, this is unrealistic to be assumed, since if you had fish and chips for dinner, then do you want to eat the 
same dinner tomorrow?  
Stationary instantaneous utility  
The assumption of a constant utility function is based on the view that the decision-making of agents is affected by 
customs and habits that are reflected in stable preferences. I am aware that we find in the economy a group of 
innovators who do not decide based on their habits and change their preference based on new market opportunities. 
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But on the other hand, among us, there is a large group of agents with the obsessive-compulsive disorder (in a mild or 
sometimes even advanced form). I am convinced that each of us has some rituals, or repeated sets of activities, which 
will be reflected in shopping behaviour. 
Independence of discounting  
A very important point for the discounting model is its independence. For the discounting consumption of all the 
agents, I use the average discount factor of the whole consumer basket ݔԦ ൌ ሺݔଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௜ǡ ǥ ǡ ݔேሻ.  
3.2. Components of the new model 
Subjective discount rate (ρ) 
In the model, the subjective discount rate (ρ) will be represented only by patience in consumption, which is not 
affected by other factors, such as uncertainties in the environment. 
Although I suppose that the subjective discount rate (ρ) can take only positive values (see Chapter 4.1), I do not 
rule out that the final subjective discount factor (β) can have values that would indicate a negative time preference. 
This may occur when the positive time preference expressed subjective discount rate (ρ) will be affected in opposite 
direction of the other variables in the model (see below).  
In terms of the hedonic approach, patience in consumption will belong to the group characteristics of the agent, i.e. 
ሬ݄Ԧ ൌ ሺ݄ଵǡ ݄ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݄௜ǡ ǥ Ǥ ݄௠ሻ, see Charpter 2.4. This is an exogenous variable of the discounting model. 
General risk-aversion (k) 
Another exogenous parameter of the model consists in the general risk-aversion of the agent, which characterizes 
the agent and thus belongs to the vectorሬ݄ሬሬԦ. This variable will be marked “k”. General risk-aversion represents the 
agent’s relationship to various forms of risk which stem from the state area. In the model, I will assume that risk-
aversion is constant in time, i.e. the agent’s quality does not change significantly in the course of their life, even though 
it is intuitively assumed that for example pregnant women will have higher risk-aversion than before their pregnancy. 
Loss-aversion (s) 
The loss-aversion is one of the most important "innovations" of the parametric discounting model. It is based on 
the theory of the creators of this approach, Kahneman and Tversky (1984), that can, without any difficulty using the 
aversion to losses, eliminate two anomalies arising from the exponential and hyperbolic discounting (see critique Read, 
2001), and the asymmetry in discounting. 
This variable is exogenous and constant over time. It represents the characteristic of an agent and therefore it 
belongs to the set ሬ݄ԦǤ 
The objective probability of negative phenomena in economy (πt) 
The parameter of the objective probability of negative phenomena in economy represents the uncertainty arising 
from the state of the environment in which agent lives: ݖԦǤ  
The factors which form decisions of each agent can be expressed by means of the so-called objective probability 
(π). There is the probability of "the environment status" (e.g. wage increases, getting a job, winning the lottery, etc.). 
The positive environment status (good) has probability πg and negative environment status (bad) has probability: πb = 
(1 - πg). 
If households have a general risk-aversion, then an increase the objective probability πb, will lead to a higher caution 
in intertemporal decision-making of agents. This change will increase the value of the subjective discount factor (β), 
and thus reduce the current against future consumption. 
The objective probability model will represent an exogenous variable that takes into account the incidence of 
negative environment states (recession, high unemployment, unstable political environment, global economic 
recession or threat of crisis, war, terrorist attack, the negative effects of global weather changes, earthquakes and many 
others). The presence of the negative states in the economy is then extended to the previously mentioned risk aversion. 
Subjective probability of negative phenomena in economy (pt) 
The last variable of the discount model consists in a subjective probability of negative phenomena in the economy. 
It is an endogenous variable calculated from objective probabilities, risk-aversion and loss-aversion. 
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3.3. Model discounting consumption with psychological parameters 
Generally, I proceed from the models mentioned in the work of Rachlin (2006) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) 
and I link these models together. Before I move to the specific form of the discounting model, I would like to note the 
general function of expected utility and hedonic utility function. 
The expected utility function (Bernoulli, 1738; von Neumann a Morgenstern, 1947):  
 ܷ௘ሺ݌ǡ ݔሻ ൌ σ ݑሺݔ௜ሻǤ ݌ሺݔ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ  (16) 
This function will serve as the basis for the design of inter-temporal functions. It will be incorporated in the function 
instead of the objective probability p(xi), as well as the risk-aversion (k) and loss-aversion (s): 
 ܷሺݖǡ ݄ǡ ݔሻ ൌ σ ߚ൫ݖ௧ሬሬሬԦǡ ݄௧ሬሬሬሬԦ൯Ǥ ݑሺݔ௧ሻ∞௧ୀ଴  (17) 
Where u(xt) is a basic utility function of the valued good and ߚ൫ݖ௧ሬሬሬԦǡ ݄௧ሬሬሬሬԦ൯is the subjective discount factor, whose 
general form using the defined parameters is as follows: 
 ߚሺݐሻ ൌ σ ݌௧௕ሺߨ௧௕ǡ ݇ǡ ݏሻ
ଵ
ሺଵାఈ௧ሻγȀഀ
∞
௧ୀ଴  (18) 
Where ݌ሺߨ௧௕ǡ ݇ǡ ݏሻ element represents the subjective probability of the negative environment status. This element 
of functions ߚሺݐሻ may affect the other part of the equation ( ଵሺଵାఈ௧ሻγȀഀሻ representing the impatience in consumption 
so much that ߚሺݐሻ can take values corresponding to negative time preferences, i.e. preference for future before the 
current consumption. 
݌௧௕ is function:   
 ݌௧௕ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
ଵାሺ௧ାଵሻǤ௞భషೞǤజ೟್
ቁ  (19) 
Where: 
 ߭௧௕ ൌ
ଵିగ೟್
గ೟್
  (20) 
The equation (19) is based on the paper written by Rachlin, (2006), (see Chapter 2.3) and indexes b and g indicate 
if the environment status is bad (b) or good (g). The equation consists of the following variables: 
- “k” risk-aversion – the parameter is constant in time, k א (0; +∞): 
o k > 1: agent is risk-seeking (higher value means a higher risk-seeking) 
o k = 1: agent is risk-neutral, 
o k < 1: agent is risk-averse (the value of k running to zero means that the agent is more and more risk-
averse). 
- “s” loss-aversion – the parameter is constant in time, s א (-∞; +∞): 
o s < 0: agent is loss-averse, in the equation, the aversion to loss reduces the value of risk aversion, as 
people in the case of threats of loss are willing to accept higher risk. For instance, mean or stingy 
agents show a high level of loss-aversion. 
o s = 0: agent is loss-neutral, 
o s > 0: agent is loss-seeking, he may be for example an altruistic agent. 
The equation (20) represents the chance that the negative (bad) environment status, respectively it is a risk which 
is calculated as a proportion of the probability of a positive (good) environment status ࣊࢏
ࢍ and the probability of a 
negative environment status ࣊࢏࢈, being understood that࣊࢏
ࢍ ൌ ૚ െ ࣊࢏࢈. 
From the macroeconomic perspective, the aggregate value of the probability of the negative environment status ࢚࣊࢈ሬሬሬሬሬԦ 
it will represent a weighted average of the most important negative environment status at the time t, which affect the 
decision-making of agents. The calculation of the vector of probability of the negative environment status ߨ௧௕ሬሬሬሬԦ ൌ
൫ߨ௧ǡଵ௕ ǡ ǥ ǡ ߨ௧ǡ௜௕ ǡ ǥ ǡ ߨ௧ǡே௕ ൯ will be: 
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 ߨ௧௕ ൌ
σ గ೟ǡ೔್ Ǥ௔೔ಿ೔సభ
σ ௔೔ಿ೔సభ
  (21) 
Where ࢚࣊ǡ࢏࢈  is the probability that the negative i-th environment status; ai represents weights, or the importance of 
the environment for the agent’s decision-making. 
Below are examples of the most important environment according to the study of ING Bank (2014), and the 
objective probability of the negative environment status (at time t): 
1. Growth of prices ൫࢚࣊ǡ૚࢈ ൯; 
2. Loss of job ൫࢚࣊ǡ૛࢈ ൯; 
3. Unplanned expenditure ൫࢚࣊ǡ૜࢈ ൯; 
4. Pay cut ൫࢚࣊ǡ૝࢈ ൯. 
We may add more examples to these environments:  
5. Economic crisis or recession ൫࢚࣊ǡ૞࢈ ൯; 
6. Increasing taxes or fees ൫࢚࣊ǡ૟࢈ ൯; 
7. Political and social development ൫࢚࣊ǡૠ࢈ ൯. 
If we write all the parameters in the equation (18), we obtain: 
 ࢼሺ࢚ሻ ൌ σ ൬ൣ૚ ൅ ሺ࢚ ൅ ૚ሻǤ ࢑૚ି࢙Ǥ ࣏࢚࢈൧ ൤ሺ૚ ൅ ࢻ࢚ሻ
ܔܖሺ૚శ࢚࣋ሻ
ࢻ ൨൰
ି૚
∞
࢚ୀ૙  (22) 
At first glance, the model seems to be too complicated, but I believe that it is not, as some of the parameters are 
constants (k, s, α). 
In the equation (22), the evaluation of objective probability is multiplied by (t + 1), thereby reducing its value over 
time (if ࣊૚࢈ is constant).  The reason for the declining value over time is the assumption that with the increasing 
distance between the present and the future means the decline of the currently rated probability that the negative 
environment status will occur in future. 
For instance, the current objective probability of losing the job is 0.9, then if k = 0.5 and s = 0 are final subjective 
probabilities in periods: t = 0, t = 1 or t = 2 these: ݌଴௕ ൌ0.947; ݌ଵ௕ ൌ0.9; ݌ଶ௕ ൌ0,857. In the period t = 1 and t = 2, 
there may be some changes of the environment status that reduce the probability that the environment status will occur 
in the future. 
Risk is its very important part of economy. For instance, empirical study Farzaneh,  Maziar, Farshid (2014) deals 
with the Mean-Conditional Value at Risk and estimating of the risk in economy. Result of this or similar studies can 
be useful for estimation of the variables of the parametric discounting model of utility. 
4. Conclusion and interpretation of the model 
The model β(t) for the discounting utility function in intertemporal decision making has been expanded with the 
effect of uncertainty of the agent. For these purposes, what was used were the objective probability of the negative 
environment status, risk-aversion “k” and loss-aversion “s”. 
If k = s = 1, then the calculated subjective probability is equal to the objective probability: ݌௧ ൌ ߨ௧
௚. 
The second part of the equation ߚሺݐሻ is the only commonly known function that reflects pure impatience of the 
agent in consumption (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). The developed model aims at demonstrating the action of some 
characteristics of the agent: (k, s, ρ) and the negative environment status: (ߨሬԦ௧
௚ሻ.  
Case studies indicate that the effect of the environment on the agents may have a more substantial influence than 
their impatience. Therefore, we extended parametric model so that it can used to explain the behaviour of European 
consumers, who in the years 2012 - 2013 behaved carefully in consumption and savings, although the nominal interest 
rate declined. 
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The model derived in this paper can be used to extend the macroeconomic models of intertemporal decision-making 
of agents (Diamnods model, OLG model, etc.). In the model, uncertainties are more important than the agent’s 
impatience, which represents the subjective discount rate. 
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